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Recent articles by Schneider and Turner (Turner and Schneider, 2017; Schneider and Turner, 2017) 
outline an artificial consciousness test (ACT); a new, purely behavioral process to probe subjective 
experience (“phenomenal consciousness”: tickles, pains, visual experiences, and so on) in machines; 
work that has already resulted in a provisional patent application from Princeton University 
(Turner and Schneider, in press). In light of the author’s generic skepticism of “consciousness qua 
computation” (Bishop, 2002, 2009) and Tononi and Koch’s “Integrated Information Theory”-driven 
skepticism regarding the possibility of consciousness arising in any classical digital computer (due 
to low ϕmax) (Tononi and Koch, 2015), consideration is given to the claimed sufficiency of ACT to 
determine the phenomenal status of a computational artificial intelligence (AI) system.
In science and science fiction, the hope is periodically reignited that a computer system will one 
day be conscious in virtue of its execution of an appropriate program; indeed, as far back as 2004, the 
UK funding body EPSRC awarded an “Adventure Fund” grant [GR/S47946/01] of around £500,000, 
to a team of “Roboteers and Psychologists” at the Universities of Essex and Bristol, with a goal of 
instantiating “machine consciousness” in a humanoid-like robot called Cronos. In addition, extant 
claims of “machine consciousness” have long been claimed in the scientific literature. (For example, 
in 2002, Kevin Warwick announced his “Cybernetic learning robots” to be “as conscious as a slug” 
(Warwick, 2002).)
Other proposals for conscious machines have ranged from the mere “functional consciousness” 
of Stan Franklin’s “Intelligent Distribution Agent” (Franklin, 2003) to the claim of “true conscious 
cognition” of [Pentti] “Haikonen’s Cognitivist Architecture” (HCA), an architecture that seeks to 
reproduce the processes of perception, inner imagery, inner speech, pain, pleasure, emotions, and 
the cognitive functions behind these. Haikonen has asserted that, when implemented with sufficient 
complexity, HCA will develop consciousness (Haikonen, 2012).
It is in this febrile atmosphere that Schneider and Turner (2017) highlight the importance of a 
test to ascertain machine consciousness as (i) it may be deemed morally improper to oblige such 
machines to “serve” humans; (ii) it could raise safety concerns; and (iii) it could impact on the 
viability of brain-implant technologies (Hampson et al., 2013). Hence, given the impact of an ACT 
result that ascribes consciousness to machine, it is critical that the test is both robust and accurate; 
in this context, Schneider and Turner explicitly clarify that passing ACT “… is sufficient but not 
necessary evidence for AI consciousness.”
Given that one of the most forceful indications that humans experience consciousness is that 
every adult can readily and quickly grasp concepts based on this quality, Schneider and Turner 
describe their ACT as follows:
[T]he ACT would challenge an AI with a series of increasingly demanding natural language 
interactions to see how quickly and readily it can grasp and use concepts and scenarios based 
on the internal experiences we associate with consciousness. At the most elementary level 
we might simply ask the machine if it conceives of itself as anything other than its physical 
self. At a more advanced level, we might see how it deals with ideas and scenarios such as 
those mentioned in the previous paragraph. At an advanced level, its ability to reason about 
and discuss philosophical questions such as ‘the hard problem of consciousness’ would be 
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evaluated. At the most demanding level, we might see 
if the machine invents and uses such a consciousness-
based concept on its own, without relying on human 
ideas and inputs.
Turner and Schneider claim that the above procedure is suf-
ficient to establish consciousness in any “boxed-in” AI system 
(i.e., any AI not connected to the Internet); any AI that passes 
ACT will be conscious. But could a non-conscious AI machine 
cheat? Schneider and Turner (2017) specifically consider this 
question, outlining the following possible scenario:
Even today’s robots can be programmed to make 
convincing utterances about consciousness, and a 
truly superintelligent machine could perhaps even use 
information about neurophysiology to infer the pres-
ence of consciousness in humans. If sophisticated but 
non-conscious AIs aim to mislead us into believing that 
they are conscious for some reason, their knowledge of 
human consciousness could help them do so.
The solution here, so the author’s suggest, is simply to “box-in” 
the AI, denying it access to the Internet and “… making it unable 
to get information about the world or act outside of a circumscribed 
domain.”
But this methodology yields its own problems. For even if we 
cut off access to the Internet—and the AIs knowledge domain is 
restricted to “prohibit it from gaining any knowledge of the world, 
especially information about conscious experience and neurosci-
ence”—we are led to the problem of explicitly identifying, a priori, 
precisely what knowledge needs to be circumscribed in this 
manner; alternatively, as one of the reviewers of this short piece 
pithily observed, if we cut off access to the Internet but allow 
access to the entire knowledge of the World Wide Web to be 
“pre-loaded” into the “box,” then the boxing-in idea would not 
appear to have added anything to the argument.
In addition, because the principle of computational multiple 
realizability states that, despite potential underlying physical 
differences in operation, it is possible to run the same functional 
program (e.g., Microsoft Word) on very different architectures 
(cf. Windows, MAC, SCO Unix, etc.), it is clear that were an AI’s 
successful responses merely generated by a suitably large “look-
up table” (Block, 1981), it would still qualify as “passing” ACT.
Moreover, Schneider clarified at PTAI conference (Leeds, 
2017) that ACT is robust to repeated use of exactly the same 
question set: if machine M, given a set A of k questions, responds 
with a set A* of k answers, in such a way that it is deemed to 
have passed ACT (and consciousness is ascribed to M), then if, 
posing exactly the same question set A to a second machine M*, 
generates exactly the same responses A*, then M* must also be 
deemed to have passed ACT; so construed, we note that the test 
is explicitly behaviorist in its conception.
Unfortunately, an unintended consequence of such behav-
iorism is that any trivial machine M**, hard coded to explicitly 
respond to question set A with responses A* (i.e., any machine 
simply programmed to output these k responses to those k ques-
tions), must also be deemed to pass ACT.
For these reasons, unless we are content to ascribe conscious 
sensation to a mere look-up table [of a list of acceptable questions 
and answers], it is not clear that ACT (or any purely behavioral 
test) can succeed as a sufficient test to establish phenomenal 
consciousness in an artificial system; furthermore, it is observed 
that objections to behaviorism along these lines date back at least 
to Chomsky’s sharp critique (Chomsky, 1959) of the cognitive 
vapidity of Skinner’s (Skinner, 1957) approach to language.
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